Helpdesk Report: How does education affect migration from fragile and conflict-affected areas?

Date: 5 October 2016

Query: What evidence there is that lack of education in fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) is a pull factor for migrants, and to what extent does the provision of education reduce the desire of people to move? We are interested in the specific question of the extent to which migration from fragile and conflict affected countries can be influenced by education provision. This should include the extent to which refugee decisions about moving from a first country of asylum are affected by education provision.

Content

1. Overview
2. Reasons for migrating
3. Case studies
4. Further resources
5. Additional information

1. Overview

This report found that almost all of the information on education and migration from fragile and conflict-affected states (FCAS) deals with integrating refugees into schools, providing schools in refugee camps, and/or using education to promote peace and tolerance. This body of literature often includes the educational level and status of migrants, but does not examine whether education is a reason for migration.

The large quantity of literature examined for this review (approximately 100 studies) on reasons for migrating away from conflict showed no evidence that education was a strong factor in decisions. Violence, security, economic factors and social networks are all given consistently in the literature as the primary drivers of migration from FCAS. Some literature on the reasons for migration away from conflict-affected areas does include education as a factor playing into decisions, but it is usually mentioned very briefly as one of a number of socio-economic factors. Educational services have some influence as both a push and pull factor, but are generally listed as of low importance. The evidence included below is some of the very small segment of the literature which does include some analysis of the impact of education on migration from fragile and conflict-affected areas.

Possibly this finding is because there are very few studies that consider this question in any meaningful way. Lack of data is a chronic problem in humanitarian contexts. It is not possible to provide experimental or counterfactual evidence on this topic, as this would require providing educational services to some migrants and not others, and examining whether these affected decisions to migrate, which in the case of people who did not migrate onwards would be a hypothetical question. The only example of this found for this report is Ethiopia’s Out-of-
Camp scheme, which allows Eritrean refugees to attend Ethiopian universities. In some cases, this has led to Eritreans settling in Ethiopia and not seeking to migrate further. However, there is no strong, generalisable evidence from which to draw policy conclusions.

In general, across low-income contexts, more educated people are more likely to migrate, due to a combination of greater aspirations and lack of appropriate employment in their home environment. Literature and experts are very consistent on this. This review found no literature on whether this trend holds true for conflict-affected populations.

The literature suggests that education plays very little role in the decision to leave a conflict-affected area, as this is primarily a security issue, followed by livelihoods issues. However, education may play a part once people are on the move, in deciding where to go. These decisions are made on the information available about where refugees can see making a viable life: work, education, healthcare, citizenship, ease of access, and safety are the main factors. These reasons for migrating onwards from a first country of asylum overlap quite strongly with traditional reasons for economic migration, and the two may be considered closely related. The literature is consistent in noting that these decisions and reasons may change over the course of the journey.

Economic prospects and education are closely related and hard to disentangle. People giving education as a reason to migrate usually associate this with the prospect of eventually getting a decent job. Children’s education is often considered a family investment for the future. Thus when they cite economic reasons for deciding on a particular place, this may also implicitly include educational services.

There is a slight suggestion that the current Syrian refugees are more likely to desire education than other refugees as they had high-quality education at home before the conflict, and that they continue to value it highly. In the Horn of Africa, girls often cite lack of education and early marriage as push factors; they migrate in order to avoid these and seek better opportunities. Female refugees across contexts are less likely to want to return home if they have been receiving education in their refugee situations and see no prospect of this continuing if they return. There is a strong literature on tertiary education. Universities considered high-quality have a strong pull.

There is little to no evidence to suggest that provision of education in FCAS would change migration flows; as education is not a key driver of migration such provision is not likely to overcome the stronger drivers of insecurity and livelihood opportunities. Higher wages and better livelihoods are more important drivers than educational services. As noted above, in non-conflict contexts, greater education may encourage migration if a poorly developed job market means people cannot obtain work.

Definitions

The terms used throughout this report are those used in the original studies. The following definitions are taken from the International Organization for Migration1:

**Asylum seeker:** A person who seeks safety from persecution or serious harm in a country other than his or her own and awaits a decision on the application for refugee status under relevant international and national instruments.

**Forced migration:** A migratory movement in which an element of coercion exists, including threats to life and livelihood, whether arising from natural or man-made causes (e.g. movements of refugees and internally displaced persons as well as people displaced by

1 [http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms](http://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms)
natural or environmental disasters, chemical or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects).

**Internally Displaced Person (IDP):** Persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or to leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of or in order to avoid the effects of armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognized State border.

**Irregular migration:** Movement that takes place outside the regulatory norms of the sending, transit and receiving countries. There is no clear or universally accepted definition of irregular migration. There is, however, a tendency to restrict the use of the term “illegal migration” to cases of smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons.

**Labour migration (or economic migration):** Movement of persons from one State to another, or within their own country of residence, for the purpose of employment.

**Migrant:** IOM defines a migrant as any person who is moving or has moved across an international border or within a State away from his/her habitual place of residence, regardless of (1) the person's legal status; (2) whether the movement is voluntary or involuntary; (3) what the causes for the movement are; or (4) what the length of the stay is.

**Push-pull factors:** Push factors drive people to leave their country (such as economic, social, or political problems) and pull factors attract them to the country of destination.

**Receiving country:** Country of destination or a third country. In the case of return or repatriation, also the country of origin.

**Refugee:** A person who, "owing to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinions, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. The 1984 Cartagena Declaration states that refugees also include persons who flee their country "because their lives, security or freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public order."

**Repatriation:** The personal right of a refugee, prisoner of war or a civil detainee to return to his or her country of nationality under specific conditions laid down in various international instruments.

**Resettlement:** The relocation and integration of people (refugees, internally displaced persons, etc.) into another geographical area and environment, usually in a third country. In the refugee context, the transfer of refugees from the country in which they have sought refuge to another State that has agreed to admit them.

### 2. Reasons for migrating

**Journeys to Europe. The role of policy in migrant decision-making**


This report aims to increase understanding of the journeys made by migrants to Europe. Based on in-depth interviews with more than 50 migrants, refugees and asylum seekers who have recently arrived in Berlin, London, Madrid and Manchester, it explores: the journeys
migrants take; the factors that drive them; and the capacity of destination country migration policies to influence people’s decisions, both before their journey begins and along the way.

The factors that push people into migration can include a wide range of things. Political and economic insecurity, conflict, violence, human rights abuses and repressive governments affected many respondents, forcing them to leave. But decisions about where to go might include economic and social factors such as educational services. The authors stress that none of the reasons why asylum seekers and refugees want to get to European countries – good education systems, safety, human rights, employment opportunities – does anything to challenge, undermine or call into question the reasons they have fled warzones.

Once on the move, aside from the presence of family and friends, the interviews suggest that education and employment are the two most important factors influencing people’s thinking about where to go. Destinations often start off undefined, forming into something more solid as journeys are ‘moved through’. In some cases, the destination is the broad idea of ‘Europe’. People often plan only one country ahead. At this stage, the destination will just be a neighbouring country and there may not be a clear plan beyond this.

Plans and destinations are shaped by where people see a viable future. ‘Locational objectives’ were overwhelmingly universal: people wanted a place that offers safety and security, employment, schooling and education and decent living conditions. For young people and those with young children – and even for those without, but who are thinking long term – education is central. People want places with a decent schooling system, where they can realistically get their children a good education over the coming years. In one focus group with five Syrian women in Berlin, this reason was placed front and centre; it was clearly the most influential factor driving their movement towards Germany. A number of interviewees cited low living standards and a lack of access to essential services, especially those experienced in refugee camps in Ethiopia and Somalia, as a reason to move on. Respondents shared their experiences about crowded, unsanitary living conditions and lack of access to food and clean water. Perceptions of risk, viability and opportunity change, so people may move on after a while, some even years later. This means people may move to one place initially with the intention to settle, but then move on when reality does not meet expectations.

Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends of migration to Europe.

This Rapid Evidence Assessment was commissioned by DFID to examine the state and strength of knowledge on the drivers of irregular migration to Europe in the current Mediterranean crisis. It does not mention anything specifically about educational services, but does provide insights into the migration flows to Europe.

The evidence is clear that the reasons why asylum-seekers and economic migrants choose to make the dangerous journey to Europe are often similar and a person may fit both of these categories at the same time. At the centre of this is the need for secure livelihood opportunities. However, an individual’s trajectory is difficult to predict, and a person’s motivations and intentions may change frequently throughout their journey.

Outside of conflict-affected areas, as a country’s economy grows, emigration is likely to increase as more people have the necessary financial resources and information to make the journey. The relationship between development and migration has been described as a ‘migration hump’, explaining that it is not individuals from the poorest households who
migrate to Europe, but rather those who have access to sufficient resources to pay for their journey. Studies commonly report that the majority of irregular migrants are male, unmarried, in their early 20s, and have low levels of education. While it is not uncommon for irregular migrants to have secondary-level education, those with a higher level of education generally have more opportunities to migrate legally. The growing youth population in the Horn of Africa may also drive further migration from the region. Increasing employment and education opportunities in these countries would be unlikely to counteract this since people migrate not only to seek better education opportunities, but also to earn higher wages for their labour.

Forcibly Displaced: Toward a Development Approach Supporting Refugees, the Internally Displaced, and Their Hosts.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/25016

This report contains a chapter on forcibly displaced people’s choices to move, and one on choices to return. Neither chapter mentions education as a reason to move. Instead, the primary concerns are security and violence, and economic opportunities. Decisions are made under duress, with imperfect information, based on an assessment of the odds of survival under each scenario. Evidence suggests that security plays the main role, whether in deciding to flee or in choosing a destination. Evidence from a range of micro-level studies shows that security-related risks are the main trigger of forced displacement and that they outweigh all other considerations.

Economic considerations play a secondary role. Cross-country quantitative studies and empirical analyses show that individuals consider economic factors when weighing their chances under different scenarios: their situation in the place of origin, their prospects in the place of destination, the nature of their assets, and the affordability of the journey. When they have a choice, most people prefer to stay in a relatively familiar environment, leading to greater numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) than refugees. The primacy of security considerations is evident in the choice of destination, as the forcibly displaced consistently seek safer locations than the place of origin. Areas with higher wages and better social services are more attractive as they potentially offer more opportunities. When deciding whether to stay, return home, or move on, when they do have options, their decision-making process may be partly similar to that of economic migrants: they compare their welfare in their place of displacement with their likely welfare in the place they could move to, including back home. Among safe destinations, they choose the place where they believe they will maximise their welfare, based on economic considerations as well as on a host of other factors, including social, cultural, and political. Men and women also tend to consider different factors in making their decision: women may give more weight to health and education, while men may be more concerned about employment.

Seeking the views of irregular migrants: Decision making, drivers and migration journeys

This paper reports the findings of a survey of irregular maritime arrivals who have been granted a permanent visa in Australia. The majority of irregular migrants were motivated by multiple factors, including education. The most prominent factor was protection. Poor education facilities in home countries was mentioned as a reason to leave, along with poverty, corruption and unemployment, aside from the most important issue of security. Education was listed as a problem at home by 30 per cent of the respondents. The most
common reason for leaving was for general insecurity/conflict (42 per cent), followed by ‘better education services’ (15 per cent).

Refugees and IDPs after Conflict: Why They Do Not Go Home

Using Bosnia, Afghanistan, Iraq and Burundi as case studies, this paper argues that the effects of protracted conflict and displacement mean that, for many, returning home is not a viable solution. Going home and reestablishing rights to land matters a great deal to some of the returnees and IDPs, but for many others, the challenge is to settle where they can maintain decent livelihoods, find peaceful conditions, have access to health care and education, and enjoy the full rights of citizenship. Social services have assumed growing importance for refugee and IDP populations, as access to health and education has long-term value for their own, and their children’s, future. Among the reasons most often heard for refugees’ and IDPs’ rejecting the option to return to their places of origin is that families do not want to lose the access to education and health care they had as refugees and urbanised IDPs, and which many have come to consider as important as income generation opportunities. Returnees to remote rural villages find very limited opportunities to school their children, and while building schools, health clinics, and installing public works may be on their government’s future agenda, their lack in the present sharply deters return. In particular, female refugees and urban IDPs, while displaced, may have had access to education, live less isolated lives and, in many instances, come to value themselves to a greater extent.

3. Case studies

Afghanistan

In UNHCR’s regular profiling of Syrian and Afghan arrivals in Europe, education is listed as a low-level driver. In May 2016, five per cent of 181 Afghans in Greece gave educational opportunities as a reason for choosing destination countries (respect for human rights was top at 34 per cent, and family reunifications second at 32 per cent). Two per cent gave education as a reason to leave Afghanistan (71 per cent gave conflict/violence). In May 2016, nine per cent of 291 Syrians in Greece gave educational opportunities as a reason for choosing destination countries (family reunification was top at 45 per cent, and respect for human rights second at 17 per cent). 0.34 per cent gave education as a reason to leave Syria (92 per cent gave conflict/violence/war).

Children on the Move. A Report on Children of Afghan Origin Moving to Western Countries
Boland, K. (2010). UNICEF.

2 http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/download.php?id=1728
The study focuses on the stories of 20 unaccompanied children of Afghan origin who have applied for asylum in Norway and the UK. Within Afghanistan, five deported children and three families with a child on the move in a western country were also interviewed.

Families interviewed in Afghanistan who have a child in the west said the decision was made because of the need to provide financial support for the family and the good economic prospects for their son in Europe. Children who were deported back to Afghanistan said their parents had made the decision for education and employment reasons. Moreover, education and employment prospects would be the trigger for their next attempt. One family with a son in Sweden and another son in the UK said that their children had moved to a western country because of the family's economic circumstances.

All 20 children interviewed in destination countries UK and Norway, said the decision was made because their lives were in danger for a political or personal reason. The children who participated in the focus group in the UK were all Pashtun and said it was not possible to stay in Afghanistan because there was no safety, proper education and job prospects, forcible recruitment by Taliban, and family feuds. All children said that existing levels of security, education and employment prospects open to them in Afghanistan were limited or non-existent. Until these needs are met, children and their families will make the decision to have a child on the move to a western country. Most respondents said that the decision to go to a particular country was based on information from relatives or neighbours who already had a child there. In other cases the child said the initial decision was to go to Europe or a western country and during the journey - in countries such as Turkey, Greece, Italy or France -- they obtained information from other children on the move about preferred destinations.

Child's motives for leaving:
- Prospect of secure future and prosperity – no prospect of secure future or financial success in Afghanistan;
- Desire for safety;
- Education leading to a good job – no prospect of a good education and job prospects in Afghanistan;
- Father's political activity with Taliban;
- Forced recruitment or kidnapping of mainly Pashtuns by Taliban or militia group;
- Success of others who made the journey;
- Fear of government agents;
- Diminishing rights and employment prospects for Hazara in Iran;
- Forcible return of Hazaras from Iran to Afghanistan;
- Sense of adventure.

Motives of family for child on the move:
- Protection and security for the child;
- The prospect that the child will generate wealth for family;
- The prospect of a good education and employment;
- To act as anchor for other family members;
- No prospects for child in neighbouring countries.

During the last three decades Afghans have consistently constituted one of the single largest groups of asylum seekers in European countries. This UNHCR-commissioned report presents the profiles and trajectories, motivations and aspirations, decision-making process and strategies of Afghans in connection to their journey to Europe and their experience of the EU asylum system.

Afghans are fleeing from violence in their country of origin and from exclusion and a lack of durable solutions in the countries of first asylum. New generations of Afghan refugees are forced to move due to similar factors as their parents, but they are compelled to seek protection in more distant places and resort to even riskier routes. Young men are overrepresented among those arriving in Europe, sent by their families to improve their situations. Success is understood as getting an official form of protection, an education and a job, and eventually marrying a girl from home and bringing her to Europe to build a family. Failure is not an option. Being returned signifies that the money that was collected for the journey has been lost. In addition to the serious repercussions of an individual's repatriation on his or her security, it is a blow to the domestic economy and would be experienced as a social shame by the whole family.

This social pressure for Afghans means that while protection needs and access to livelihoods, education and other social services may be the key driving factors leading to displacement, questions of prestige and status may be the decisive factors for the choices which are ultimately made by Afghans on the move.

The ranking of potential destination countries is ever changing. It depends on the presence of an established Afghan community, the existence of social benefits, the perceived integration possibilities into the education system and labour market, as much the actual conditions as the perception of it and hence the status it accords within the wider Afghan community.

**Horn of Africa**

**Young and on the Move: Children and youth in mixed migration flows within and from the Horn of Africa**
Cossor, E. (2016). Save the Children

As with adult migration, economic reasons and fleeing from conflict are the strongest drivers of migration in the region. Educational opportunities play a part as push/pull factors in the hope for a better life. Economic motivation is a powerful factor for both children and youth to migrate, sometimes for short or seasonal work (often younger children) or as a longer term future prospect (older children, youth). Migrating to join family in other countries (particularly Europe) was one of the most powerful ‘pull’ factors for children. Following family was also a pull factor for youth, however aspirational motivations of a better, more prosperous life emerged as the primary attraction for youth, often influenced by ‘success stories’ of migration shared through friends, family and diaspora.

According to UNICEF, the household level is the key site where choices and decisions about migration for work or other purposes are shaped and framed. The migration of children with their parents may be considered as a family investment, by realising opportunities of better education and employment, which is the main route to the future success of the second generation. Children travelling alone from Eritrea into Ethiopia are frequently sent by their families in the belief that they will find a better life, despite the risks. All key informants in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Sudan pointed to poverty, the economic hardships experienced within the family, and difficulties in providing for children’s basic needs and education as primary factors in child migration.
Migration for education has a strongly gendered aspect. Gender inequality and discrimination drives girls and women to leave in order to avoid forced marriages and to seek better educational and employment opportunities. All of the girls in the focus group discussion in Amhara region, Ethiopia, cited restrictions in access to education, for example due to child marriage, as the primary reasons for leaving home for domestic migration. KIs in Amhara also drew the link between high migration and high child marriage in their region. A report by ODI on the situation in Amhara similarly connects gender inequality, lack of education, child marriage and migration of girls. Some girls interviewed also referred to the possibility of finding domestic work, but in Ethiopia this was often cited as a means to pay for the continuation of their education; access to education being the primary motivation.

Living out of Camp: Alternatives to Camp-based Assistance for Eritrean Refugees in Ethiopia.

This research is the first study of alternatives to camp-based assistance in Ethiopia for Eritrean refugees, and the first thorough review of Ethiopia’s Out-Of-Camp scheme (OCP). The scheme allows Eritreans to live and study outside the camps if they are able to sustain themselves independently (usually through relatives or remittances). Eritrean refugees are allowed to access higher education in any university of the country, if they pass the university entrance exam. 1,200 Eritrean refugees are currently enrolled in universities. Officials expect graduates to go back to the camps and look for jobs there. However, past graduates mentioned being given the choice to stay in the city if they were able to sustain themselves. In this case, higher education can lead to a potential settlement, and local integration, outside the camps, potentially deterring onward migration. Refugees list one of the positives of the scheme as better access to education for children and adults in the city than in the camps.

The OCP is a positive opportunity offered by the Ethiopian government for a part of the Eritrean caseload and a good mechanism to rely on to make progress towards non-camp based refugee management in the country. Yet, it does not give refugees the right to work or to move freely, nor does it provide a sufficient incentive for Eritrean refugees to consider it as a sustainable solution, as most prefer opting for resettlement and further migration.

Youth, Employment and Migration in Mogadishu, Kismayo and Baidoa
Altai Consulting (2016). IOM Somalia

This review aims to assess whether opportunities for additional IOM youth programmes exist in South Central Somalia. Altai conducted a survey with 1,200 respondents under 30 across the three cities, and interviews with youth and employers. Poor economic conditions are the primary drivers of irregular migration but many youth are also pushed out by instability in the country. Economic factors are the main reasons for youth to migrate, and respondents talked about the prospect of “finding a better job” as a primary motivation to leave, followed by the motivation to simply “find a job”. The push factors emerge as more influential than pull factors and this is why awareness of the risks of the journey does not tend to deter aspiring migrants that have their heart set on migrating.

The typical aspiring migrant has an intermediary level of education: Amongst the sample, the respondents with the lowest levels of education (no education) and the respondents with the highest levels of education (master’s degree level) were the least likely to express the wish to
migrate or to have thought about migrating. Students, not the unemployed, displayed the greatest propensity to migrate: 41 per cent of non-migrants who were students reported that they have thought about leaving, against 27 per cent of unemployed non-migrants.

![Figure 39: When you Considered Going Abroad, What Made You Want to Leave?](image)

![Figure 40: Why Do You Want to Go Abroad Today? – IDPs & Returnees](image)

**Figure 1: Reasons for migrating. Source: Altai Consulting (2016: 84)**

Pull factors for Europe tend to be as follows:

- **High revenues and a decent job.**
- The ability to potentially gain a foreign passport with time.
- Robust welfare and health systems in European countries.
- High quality education, and also the ability to be able to work and study at the same time. For some, the objective is to attend a university that offers a higher quality of education than what would be available in Somalia, whereas for others, the objective is to work and study at the same time (something that some are unable to do in Somalia, which excludes them from being able to study at all).

It should also be noted that in many of the interviews, young respondents said they would be interested in migrating, in principle, but they were not actually pursuing this goal and often mentioned other projects in Somalia (for example, their current job, starting a company). For instance, 40 per cent of the respondents who reported that they were thinking about migrating today also expressed their interest in starting a company. This implies that while the young people in the sample are thinking about migrating, they will stay in Somalia if they find the opportunities that they seek in their home country. Previous research has shown that the decision to migrate is often considered for many years before the journey actually commences.

**Investing in Somali Youth: Exploring the Youth-Employment-Migration Nexus in Somaliland and Puntland.**


According to UNDP, more than 60 per cent of Somaliland’s and 50 per cent of Puntland’s population indicate willingness to migrate due to economic reasons and political and cultural
exclusion. The research makes it clear that many youth have migrated, many wish to migrate, and that unemployment and the potential for better job opportunities are the primary motivating factors of their perceptions.

While only 28 per cent of youth overall reported migration intentions, 44 per cent of those self-identifying as unemployed reported migration intentions. This supports the qualitative research: the desire for (better) employment opportunities is the biggest driver of migration abroad, whether directly (to find a better job) or indirectly (to allow youth to, for example, pursue education leading to a better job).

![Figure 2: Reasons for intended youth migration, Somalia. Source: Samuel Hall (2015: 34)](image)

The second most popular reason, “to study”, is not unrelated to this, as studying abroad is viewed as a path to better or different job opportunities. Likewise, a lack of up-to-standard educational facilities was also pointed out as driver of youth emigration from Somaliland, particularly of already highly educated youth. In case studies, FGDs and conversations, the desire to obtain a scholarship from a university abroad to pursue the studies that are either not offered in Somaliland or could not be pursued for other reasons, was particularly prevalent among already educated youth. There seems to be a widespread notion among students, as well as employers, that the right education can only be obtained abroad. Reinforcing this notion, in asylum countries (and especially Kenya or Ethiopia), the lack of quality education in Somalia was often mentioned as the main reason for refugees not wanting to return, since parents want the same educational opportunities for their children as they experienced in the camps or in their country of asylum. University and technical education are of poor quality in Somalia, and do not provide youth with marketable skills. While there is a common perception that degrees and certificates are a major prerequisite for obtaining qualified jobs, the fact is that higher education in Somaliland and Puntland does not equip youth with necessary skills to find employment. In addition, it is not recognised abroad or among international employers as university experience.

**Moving Beyond Conflict: Re-framing mobility in the African Great Lakes region**


Conflict and violence with the associated humanitarian and development crises have affected the African Great Lakes for more than three decades, creating one of the most protracted situations of displacement in the world. This paper sets out the case for exploring the broad process of migration in the region looking beyond the conflict framework that dominates analysis.
Migration for education may be a part of an individual or family’s livelihood strategy, a socio-cultural norm and perceived part of life-cycle development, or a part of an individual’s aspirations. It is possible to see migration for education as a reflection of the variation in educational opportunities across Africa; a result of macro-structural forces. A (perceived) lack of or insufficient access to educational opportunities at home and the availability of such opportunities elsewhere is another key determinant of education migration.

The insecurity in the Great Lakes region and the disruption of the education systems has certainly skewed the distribution of educational resources away from the eastern DRC and making the schools and universities of Uganda, Kenya and (more recently) Rwanda more attractive. Apart from changing these macro-structural conditions, it may also have affected the significance of migration for education within households. Evidence from across the African continent suggests that migration for education can play an important role in the survival strategy or coping mechanism for families. For instance, a family may financially sponsor one of its members to receive secondary or tertiary education abroad as a form of economic investment, if it is unable to provide for itself given dire economic conditions at home. This person is responsible for gaining employment and remitting funds back to kin in home countries. Migration within Africa for higher education is increasingly the most favoured option for youth looking for optimal education and employment opportunities. African universities are increasingly recruiting students from beyond their borders, developing partnerships or establishing overseas campuses, prompting students enrolled in home country institutions to transfer to programmes abroad. Some African governments are also developing selective immigration policies to attract foreign students in specific academic fields or with specific skills.

Receiving countries

Aspirations for higher education among newcomer refugee youth in Toronto: Expectations, challenges, and strategies.
http://refuge.journals.yorku.ca/index.php/refuge/article/view/34723/31553

Findings from this study provide new insights about educational aspirations of refugee youth between the ages of sixteen and twenty-four who arrived in Canada within the last five years, the challenges they face as they navigate secondary and tertiary education, and the strategies they utilise to address these challenges. Many newly arrived refugee youth indicated that their educational aspirations became stronger after coming to Canada. This increase in educational aspirations is a response to a number of factors related to perceived and real differences between educational systems in Canada compared to the war-torn home countries or refugee camps. These include (1) lack of quality education or access barriers to quality education in their pre-migration contexts; (2) positive experiences of learning provided by Canadian educational institutions (compared to before Canada); and (3) expectations and realisation that a Canadian education can lead to good jobs and a better future, including being able to make a good income and help family and community with the income and knowledge gained. The change in educational aspirations before and after coming to Canada is also linked to the perceived differences in the value and benefits associated with education between the two contexts. In direct contrast to pre-migration contexts, many participants perceived that education carries greater value in Canada and is an essential requirement for getting a good job.

Fleeing through the globalised education system: the role of violence and conflict in international student migration.
This article is based on a close reading of six qualitative interviews with self-defined conflict-induced student migrants in Sweden. They come from Europe, South Asia, South America, including the Caribbean, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. They have all experienced or witnessed structural, cultural and/or direct violence first hand.

These students were unlikely to have been accepted as legal migrants or asylum seekers, either because they exit conflicts when these are not active, or because the kind of violence they have experienced is not considered grounds for asylum. To the great majority of these students, leaving their home country as students either seems or is directly stated to be the only acceptable option. They express the legitimacy involved in exiting the conflict through education, however in different and to some extent gendered ways. Leaving for education is open; it is legal; your status is by definition high locally and internationally; and it is comparably easy if you have the resources necessary (education and money are essentials, while migration networks seem to be less central). In addition, leaving as a student opens new possibilities of onward migration within the international education system, and possibly in the end a highly qualified job in exile, without jeopardising the individual students’ possibilities of safe returns, or their families’ security in their home countries. All the students included in the research come from resourceful, if not rich backgrounds. While some of them secured scholarships, the others live under rather harsh economic conditions, struggling to make ends meet.

4. Further resources

Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies (INEE): www.ineesite.org

UNICEF; Children on the Move research website: https://www.unicef-irc.org/research-watch/Children%20on%20the%20move/

Save the Children International; Children on the Move in Europe website: https://savethechildreninternational.exposure.co/children-on-the-move-in-europe

Child Migration Research Network: http://www.childmigration.net/


5. Additional information

Author
This query response was prepared by Evie Browne
Contributors
Alex Ademokun, Department for International Development
Richard Arden, Department for International Development
Dean Brooks, INEE
Naoko Hashimoto, University of Sussex
Tim Howe, International Organization for Migration
Stefanie Khan, OHCHR
Alessandro Monsutti, Graduate Institute Geneva
Jo Rispoli, International Organization for Migration
David Rubyan-Ling, University of Sussex
Peter Transburg, INEE
Barbara Zeus, UNHCR

About Helpdesk reports: The HEART Helpdesk is funded by the DFID Human Development Group. Helpdesk reports are based on 3 days of desk-based research per query and are designed to provide a brief overview of the key issues, and a summary of some of the best literature available. Experts may be contacted during the course of the research, and those able to provide input within the short time-frame are acknowledged.

For any further request or enquiry, contact info@heart-resources.org

HEART Helpdesk reports are published online at www.heart-resources.org

Disclaimer
The Health & Education Advice & Resource Team (HEART) provides technical assistance and knowledge services to the British Government’s Department for International Development (DFID) and its partners in support of pro-poor programmes in education, health and nutrition. The HEART services are provided by a consortium of leading organisations in international development, health and education: Oxford Policy Management, CiBT, FHI360, HERA, the Institute of Development Studies, IPACT, the Liverpool School of Tropical Medicine and the Nuffield Centre for International Health and Development at the University of Leeds. HEART cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this report. Any views and opinions expressed do not necessarily reflect those of DFID, HEART or any other contributing organisation.